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Do Accountability Policies Push Teachers Out?
Abstract
The impact of accountability on U.S. schools, for good or ill, is a subject of debate and research. The
authors recently studied an aspect of accountability that had previously received little attention. They
asked, do accountability reforms affect public schools' ability to retain their teachers? By analyzing data
from the Schools and Staffing Survey and the Teacher Followup Survey, they found strong (but
unsurprising) evidence that accountability made teacher retention more difficult in low-performing
schools; schools whose students scored low on high-stakes assessments had higher teacher turnover
than those that scored higher; and schools that received sanctions because of their low performance had
even higher turnover. The most helpful finding of the analysis was that even in schools subject to
sanctions, higher teacher turnover was not inevitable. Schools that had better working conditions—and
especially those that gave teachers greater classroom autonomy–were able to mitigate the negative
effects of accountability sanctions. The authors conclude that holding teachers accountable for results
must be paired with giving them control over the instruction that produces these results.
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Abstract
The impact of accountability on U.S. schools, for good or ill, is a subject of debate and research.
The authors recently studied an aspect of accountability that had previously received little
attention. They asked, do accountability reforms affect public schools' ability to retain their
teachers? By analyzing data from the Schools and Staffing Survey and the Teacher Followup
Survey, they found strong (but unsurprising) evidence that accountability made teacher retention
more difficult in low-performing schools; schools whose students scored low on high-stakes
assessments had higher teacher turnover than those that scored higher; and schools that received
sanctions because of their low performance had even higher turnover. The most helpful finding
of the analysis was that even in schools subject to sanctions, higher teacher turnover was not
inevitable. Schools that had better working conditions—and especially those that gave teachers
greater classroom autonomy–were able to mitigate the negative effects of accountability
sanctions. The authors conclude that holding teachers accountable for results must be paired with
giving them control over the instruction that produces these results.

Do Accountability Policies Push Teachers
Out?
Richard Ingersoll, Lisa Merrill and Henry May
Sanctions exacerbate the teacher turnover problem in low-performing schools—but giving
teachers more classroom autonomy can help stem the flood.
School accountability may be the most controversial and significant of all contemporary U.S.
education reforms. The accountability movement began in the 1990s as some states initiated
various combinations of incentives and sanctions for schools based on student test scores, under
the theory that this combination of carrots and sticks would lead to improvements in school
performance. In January 2002, accountability gained major impetus as a nationwide reform with
the advent of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), revised in 2016 as the Every Student
Succeeds Act.
The impact of accountability on U.S. schools, for good or ill, is a subject of debate and research.
Recently, we studied an aspect of accountability that had previously received little attention
(Ingersoll, Merrill, & May, 2016). We asked, do accountability reforms affect public schools'
ability to retain their teachers?
In theory, by increasing assessment and scrutiny, accountability reforms could place new
pressure on teachers and hence increase teacher turnover, especially in lower-achieving schools.
On the other hand, an increased focus on school accountability and performance could result in
improved school leadership and management, leading to better working conditions and higher
teacher retention.

Why We Need to Understand Teacher Turnover
Elementary and secondary teaching has long been marked by relatively high rates of annual
turnover. By analyzing national data, we have found that attrition of teachers is similar to that of
police officers, higher than nurses, and far higher than lawyers, engineers, architects,
pharmacists, or academics. Moreover, the data show that the teaching force has slowly but
steadily become less stable in recent years (Ingersoll, Merrill, & Stuckey 2014).
Some departure of teachers from schools is, of course, normal, inevitable, and even beneficial.
Some teachers leave classroom teaching to pursue administrative positions or other educationrelated roles. Others leave the classroom because they discover that teaching isn't right for them.
Some turnover is due to the termination of low-performing teachers. But regardless of the reason,
none of these departures are cost-free. All teachers who depart leave a space behind, which takes
time and effort to refill.
In earlier research, we have documented that teacher turnover is the major factor behind teacher
shortages, especially in math and science (Ingersoll & Perda, 2010); and that certain working

conditions and leadership actions affect teacher turnover (Ingersoll & May, 2012). The data
make it clear that if we want to ensure that all students are taught by qualified teachers, many
schools must pay more attention to teacher retention.
Our current study examined whether each of the typical steps involved in the implementation of
accountability measures—establishing standards, using standardized assessments to measure
whether a school's students meet the standards, and applying rewards or sanctions—is related to
the subsequent departure of teachers from specific schools. We also explored how teachers'
working conditions—the quality of school leadership, the amount of classroom resources and
support provided to teachers, the level of schoolwide faculty influence over decision making, and
the degree of autonomy teachers have in their classrooms—affect the relationship between
school accountability and teacher turnover. We felt that the results of this study would be useful
to practitioners by helping individual schools and districts establish working conditions that
mitigate any potential negative effects of accountability reforms.
Our data source was the nationally representative Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) and its
supplement, the Teacher Followup Survey (TFS). Together, these are the largest and most
comprehensive data sources available on elementary and secondary teachers and schools. We
focused in particular on the 2003–2004 SASS and 2004–2005 TFS, conducted two and three
years after the advent of No Child Left Behind. These years are a useful point at which to
examine accountability because the reforms had only recently been mandated nationally; hence,
we would expect large variations in design and implementation across schools. We collected data
on the standards established and the performance assessed in schools in 2002–2003; rewards or
sanctions subsequently applied to schools in 2003–2004; and teacher turnover between 2003–
2004 and 2004–2005.
The data revealed two striking findings: (1) Some steps in school accountability were strongly
related to teacher turnover, and some were not. (2) The impact of accountability strongly
depended on teachers' working conditions in their school.

The Growth and Impact of Accountability
Following the passage of NCLB, performance-based school accountability quickly became
widespread. Almost all public schools in the United States have been subject to performance
standards and assessments established by their district or state. Our analysis of the data found
that, of those schools that were assessed in the 2002–2003 school year, more than half (54
percent) passed all the performance standards, and 39 percent of these schools subsequently
received some kind of reward. Of the 46 percent of evaluated schools that failed to pass some or
all of the standards in 2002–2003, just over half were subsequently subjected to some kind of
penalties or sanctions.
Sanctions varied in their degree of specificity, seriousness, and frequency. The most common
result of not meeting some or all of the standards was a requirement to write a school
improvement plan. Next most frequent was a tighter sanction—being put on an evaluation cycle
with required improvements by specific dates. Far less common were more punitive

consequences, such as a reduction in resources, school takeover, or reconstitution of
administrative and teaching staff.
The data also show that these reforms had an impact on teachers and their teaching practices by
2003–2004, only one year into No Child Left Behind (see fig. 1). Ninety-one percent of teachers
reported that their students participated that year in required state or district assessments. And,
regardless of whether a teacher's students were tested in that teacher's subject, the use of
standards and standardized test scores had become a ubiquitous part of life for the great majority
of teachers. Most teachers had access to their students' scores on state or district achievement
tests. Most reported that they used state or district standards to guide their teaching and used test
results to adjust their classroom curriculum and to assess weaknesses in their own content
knowledge or teaching practices. Moreover, this impact appears to have had some bite. Almost
one-third of all public teachers reported they were "somewhat" or "strongly" worried about their
job security because of the performance of their students on state or local tests.
Figure 1. Percent of Public School Teachers Who Reported They Experienced the Effects
of Accountability Policies, School Year 2003–2004

Source: What are the Effects of School Accountability on Teacher Turnover? (CPRE Research
Report), by R. Ingersoll, L. Merrill, & H. May, 2016. Philadelphia: Consortium for Policy
Research in Education, University of Pennsylvania. Copyright © 2016 by Richard Ingersoll.
Adapted with permission.
From the perspective of teacher job satisfaction, this impact has not always been viewed as
benign. Indeed, less than half (45 percent) of responding teachers reported that state or district
standards had a positive influence on their satisfaction with teaching. Our next question: What
impact did these reforms have on teacher retention and turnover?

How Accountability Affects Teacher Turnover
After controlling for the background characteristics of teachers and schools, our statistical
analyses of the SASS and TFS data showed that some steps in school accountability were related
to teacher turnover, and some were not. Perhaps surprisingly, having performance standards and
state or district assessments in a school did not have a negative effect on teacher retention—these
factors did not, in and of themselves, drive out teachers.
However, how schools performed on assessments did affect retention and turnover. Not
surprisingly, successful schools had better retention, and less-successful schools had worse
retention. Interestingly, rewards given to higher-performing schools did little to improve these
schools' already-higher retention. In contrast, sanctions applied to lower-performing schools did
a lot to worsen their already-lower retention. One of the most consequential sanctions for teacher
turnover was a school being put on an evaluation cycle with specific deadlines for improvement.
Thirty percent of the low-performing schools were subject to this sanction, either alone or in
combination with other sanctions. These schools had significantly higher turnover than did lowperforming schools that were not subject to this sanction.
Is there anything that low-performing schools, especially those subject to sanctions, can do to
ameliorate their losses of teachers? Is it possible to implement accountability in a way that does
not exacerbate low-performing schools' problems by driving out more teachers?
The data show large school-to-school differences in the four working conditions we examined:
the quality of school leadership, the amount of classroom resources and support provided to
teachers, the level of schoolwide faculty influence over decision making, and the degree of
autonomy teachers have in their classrooms. And these differences in working conditions
mattered for retention. Teachers in schools with higher levels of leadership support, classroom
resources, schoolwide influence, or classroom autonomy all had significantly lower turnover,
after controlling for the background characteristics of the teachers and schools as well as school
performance, rewards, or sanctions.
One of our four working conditions—classroom teacher autonomy—was especially powerful in
ameliorating the effects of accountability in low-performing schools. The relationship of
sanctions to teacher turnover in these schools strongly depended on how much autonomy
teachers were allowed in their own classrooms over key issues: selecting textbooks and other
instructional materials; choosing content, topics, and skills to be taught; evaluating and grading
students; selecting teaching techniques; determining the amount of homework to be assigned;
and disciplining students.
In general, sanctioned low-performing schools gave teachers less classroom autonomy than other
schools did. But those sanctioned low-performing schools that did provide greater classroom
autonomy to teachers had far lower teacher turnover. In other words, low-performing schools
with sanctions had far higher turnover if their teachers were allowed less classroom autonomy,
and they had far lower turnover if their teachers were allowed more autonomy.

Figure 2 illustrates the differences in the levels of teacher turnover, according to the performance
of schools. On average, 12.6 percent of the teachers in the higher-performing schools departed
between the 2004 and 2005 school years. Turnover was higher (15.7 percent) in low-performing
schools (those that failed to pass some or all of the performance standards). Turnover was
highest (20 percent) in low-performing schools that were subject to some kind of penalties or
sanctions. However, among low-performing sanctioned schools, those that gave teachers greater
classroom autonomy had significantly lower turnover—in fact, the rate (12.2 percent) was
similar to that in higher-performing schools. Thus, our analysis shows that it is not inevitable that
sanctioned low-performing schools lose more teachers.
Figure 2. Percent of Teachers Who Left Between 2004 and 2005, by School Performance,
Sanctions, and Level of Teacher Autonomy: School Year 2004–2005

Source: What are the Effects of School Accountability on Teacher Turnover? (CPRE Research
Report), by R. Ingersoll, L. Merrill, & H. May, 2016. Philadelphia: Consortium for Policy
Research in Education, University of Pennsylvania. Copyright © 2016 by Richard Ingersoll.
Adapted with permission.

Give Teachers the Tools They Need
Nothing in our study suggests that school accountability is a bad thing. Proponents of
accountability reforms have identified important issues and problems; establishing standards and
requiring transparency about school performance are reasonable and necessary actions. The
public has a right and, indeed, an obligation to be concerned with the performance of schools and
teachers. Moreover, there is no question that some schools and teachers are performing poorly, in
one way or another.
However, the evidence shows that implementation of accountability reforms can contribute to
school performance problems; if we overlook that fact, such reforms may backfire. If the way
schools are managed and organized undermines the ability of teachers to feel successful in
helping students learn—the very reason many of them went into teaching in the first place—such
reforms may not only fail to solve the problems they seek to address, but may also end up
making things worse.

In plain terms, it stands to reason that if teachers are to successfully meet standards, schools must
be organized in ways that give teachers the tools, capabilities, and resources they need to do so.
Our data suggest that a key resource that teachers value is having sufficient control over
instructional decisions in their classrooms.
This finding is especially relevant for hard-to-staff and low-performing schools (often the same
entities). In addition to school-level accountability, federal and state regulations also mandate
that schools successfully staff all of their core academic classrooms with highly qualified
teachers. If low-performing schools are to ensure that all their classrooms are staffed with
qualified teachers, they must give their staff sufficient control and autonomy in their classrooms.
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